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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND C. HANSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MARY J. HANSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13985

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
An appeal by the defendant, Mary J. Hansen, from
an Amended Decree of Divorce entered against her in
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State
of Utah, the Honorable George E. BaJlif, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the plaintiff-respondent a
Decree of Divorce against the defendant-appellant upon
the grounds of great mental distress, pursuant to Sbction
30-3-1 (7), U. C. A. (1953), as amended.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent prays that the Amended Decree
of Divorce be affirmed and that he be awarded his costs
incurred herein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiff-respondent finds the defendant-appellant Statement of the Facts inconsistent with the facts
in the above-entitled matter in the following particulars:
1. The testimony of psychiatrist Delbert P. Pearson, M. D., was that the acts of the defendant did cause
the plaintiff mental anguish (Trial Trans. 38).
2. In addition to the award set out in Appellant's
Statement of Facts, the lower court awarded the defendant-appellant a life estate in the mobile home and lot
owned jointly by the parties; ordered the plaintiff to
pay the premiums on the Blue Cross-Blue Shield medical
insurance policy, and awarded her the beneficial interest
in the life insurance policies (Tr. 50-52).
3. The xmcontroverted evidence was that for the
two years immediately preceding the trial the defendant
had been gainfully employed and was earning approximately $2.00 per hour, 40 hours per week (Trial Trans.
42).
4. The defendant contended that her medicine bills
were approximately $100.00 per month but her own evidence showed that her needs were only $70.00 per month.
(Tr. 74).
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5. An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered increasing the alimony to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant from $30.00 to $70.00 per month.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ITS FINDING OF FACTS TO SUPPORT A
DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Plaintiff sought and was granted a Divorce Decree
pursuant to Section 30-3-1 (7) U. C. A. (1953), as
amended, upon the grounds of great mental distress. The
Court found cruel treatment causing the plaintiff great
mental distress after a Decree of Sepanaite Maintenance
was entered between the parties in August of 1972.
This Court has set down rules for review in divorce
cases, providing thait the actions of the trial count are
presumed valid and correct unless the appellant sustains
the burden of showing that the evidence clearly preponderates against the Decree of the Court.
. . . (D)ue to the prerogatives and advantaged
position of the trial court, we pursue that broad
authorization under certain rules of review which
are now well established: Its actions are indulged with a presumption of validity and correctness and the burden is upon the appellant
to show a basis for upsetting them: either (1)
that findings have been made when the evidence
clearly preponderates the other way, or (2) that
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there has been a mfeunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, or (3) that it appears plainly
that there has been such an abuse of discretion
that an inequity or injustice has resulted. Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2nd 277, 488 P. 2d 308,
310, (1971).
There is no evidence before this Court upon which
it might find the facts preponderate against a showing
of mental cruelty. The defendant, in her own testimony,
stated that the parties had not had a friendly discussion
in approximately two years (Trial Trans, 40).
The defendant argues that the incidents the plaintiff testified to which caused him great mental anguish,
surely could not cause a retired naval officer with the
plaintiff's background to be mentally distressed. The
defendant-appellant further argues that the incidents
testified to by the plaintiff were nothing more than the
natural and usual disagreements and misunderstandings
that accompany any normal marriage. No one, after
reading the transcript, could reasonably say that the
plaintiff and the defendant have a normal marital relationship.
Mental cruelty causing great mental anguish "must
be ascertained from the facts of each case, individually,
in light of the sensibilities of the particular person; hence,
the ultimate question is not so much the conduct of the
defendant, but the effect of such conduct on the plaintiff." Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.
2d 923 (1962). The trial court had the opportunity to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
see the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor and credibility.
This is simply not a case where this Court can say
that the evidence clearly preponderates against the Decree of the district court. The trial judge was able to
evaluate the demeanor of those who testified to the individual sensibilities of the plaintiff, and therefore, should
have been able to accurately determine if the particular
incidents, in this particular case, constituted mental
cruelty toward the plaiintiff.
The trial court found that there was substantial and
satisfactory evidence upon which to grant the plaintiff a
divorce. This Court has stated that "when the promotion
of happiness, welfare, health, and morality of the parties
and their children are not at stake in a divorce, then
there is no public interest in the preservation of the mariage." Stevenson, supra, at 924.
It appears that the only reason the defendant does
not want a divorce is a purely financial one, the loss of
the Champus insurance benefits, and therefore, there
being no other circumstances which would justify denying this particular divorce, it should be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN THE AMOUNT OF
ALIMONY AWARDED.
Very recently this Court, in the case of Mitchell v.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
Mitchell,
that

Utah 2d

, 527 P. 2d 1359 (1974), stated

. . . (I)n a divorce action, the trial court has
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting
financial and property interests, and its actions
are indulged with a presumption of validity.
The biorden is upon the appellant to prove that
. . . a serious inequitay has resulted as to manifest a dear abuse of discreition. Id. at 1360.
The record reveals that the trial court considered
and reconsidered the economic and medical condition of
the parties, the fact that they were both self-supporting,
that they had not lived together for some time, the fact
that the defendant was awarded practically all of the
property, and income property that was accumulated
during the marriage, and the fact that the plaintiff had
arranged to provide for the defendant's medical needs as
best he could, in arriving at its final Decree.
There is no showing of any abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Moreover, the record indicates that the
Oourt reconsidered its original alimony award and increased the award from $30.00 to $70.00 a month (Tr.
75-77), a figure which approximates the medication needs
of the defendant (Tr. 74).
The circumstances in this case are similar to the
facts in the Utah case of Ghost v. Ghost, 28 Utah 2d 396,
490 P. 2d 339 (1971), where due to the divorce of the
parties the defendant lost her right to retirement income
of approximately $80.00 per month. The Court held that
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the loss to the defendant of the $80.00 and the trial court's
failure to award alimony did not constitute an abuse of
discretion, 490 P. 2d at 340. In view of the circumstances,
it was certainly not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to fail to award $30.00 more in alimony. In Christensen v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 283, 444 P. 2d 511
(1968), this Court stated:
. . . (W)hether we as individual judges would
or would not have arrived at the exact same
formula as to what the most practical and just
treatment of the economic expects (sic) of the
situation is not the question on . . . appeal. Even
though it is the established rule that divorce
cases being in equity, it is the duty of this court
to review and weigh the evidence, it is equally
true that we have invariably recognized the advantaged position of the trial judge and given
deference to his findings and judgment, declaring that they should not be upset unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against them, or
unless the decree works such an injustice that
the equity and good conscience demand that it
be revised. 444 P. 2d at 512, 513.
The defendant-appellant has failed to show any inequity, injustice or abuse of discretion in the Amended
Decree of Divorce.
CONCLUSION
The record clearly preponderates in favor, not
against the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff established, by substantial and satisfactory evedence, that he
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should be granted a divorce. The trial court, taking into
consideration all of the peirtinent factors, made what it
considered to be an equitable alimony award and property settlement. This matter should be affirmed with
costs.
Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN K. YOUNG
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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